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The conventional narrative is that in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, the economic and political elites in Europe and America are in dispute. They simply have not delivered the goods, namely a rising living standard for a majority of people.
A wave of populism-nationalism is sweeping across the world. It is at once a rejection of the liberal globalism that had been drifting toward the end point of a world government and crystallization of a new national identity.Â
There is an alternative scenario. The rise of populism-nationalism is really two responses to the economic and financial crisis. Â
The first response was the UK’s referendum to leave the EU and the election of Donald Trump as the US 45th President. These were not populist-national victories. These were the center-right parties in essentially two-party systems embracing at least part of the populist-nationalist agenda. UKIP did not win. In fact, shortly before the June 2015 referendum, the Conservatives unexpectedly won a majority in the House of Commons. Â
In the US, the Republican Party initially resisted Trump’s insurgency candidacy, but later embraced it. This is different from what the Democrats did in 1972. Then the party nominated a left-wing populist George McGovern. The elites refused to support their party’s candidate, and he went down in flames to Nixon.Â
Europe has a different response. The populism-nationalism there is anti-EU and anti-immigration. The level of unemployment in the eurozone is nearly twice that in the US and UK. Austerity and the influx of immigrants are being blamed on both the distant Brussels elites and the domestic elites. Le Pen wants to preserve the social safety net for French citizens but thinks Brussels is preventing it. Â
In no European country is the center-right embracing the populist-nationalist parties. To the contrary, they are running against them, and no coalition is possible between say the French Republicans and the National Front or between Germany’s CDU and the AfD. Â
